Postmodernism is

Intellectual (p. 1)

Movement p. Controversial (p. 1)

Fuss (p. 3)

Relativist (p. 3, 7, 9, 18, again 18)

Subjectivist (p. 3, 7)

"vituperation" (p. 3)

"advocacy of political preferences" (p. 10).

"advocacy of preferred values" (p. 18).

"employ relativism only selectively" (p. 10).

"call for the rejection of ‘modernism’ (p. 1);

"’truth’ must be considered merely subjective" (p. 1); "view of truth is only relative to one’s circumstances" (p. 1) "puts them in opposition to mainstream science" (p. 1).

"those who sympathize with postmodernism are addressing the question of what is good" (p. 1).

"wish to engage in advocacy for preferred values and preferences" (p. 1)

"radical opposition to the status quo" p. 1).

"skepticism about conventional views" (p. 1).

"defense against those who would claim that the postmodernist’s view is not ‘true’" (p. 1).

"theoretical perspective (p. 3).

"there are no such things as ‘objectivity; or a singular ‘truth’ (p. 3).

"difficult to define not only because it has spread to so many fields, but also because its proponents criticize (as inherently modernist) attempts to define and categorize their perspective" (p. 6). " (p. 6)

"the primary motivation, for all of us engaged in scientific debate, is advancing our own values and preferences" (p. 9 x2).

"scientific evidence should be given no more credence than any other rhetorical device" (p. 9).

"as advocacy for views that question whether the status quo is a good status, and whether there is such a thing as objective truth" (p. 10).

"concern for values and a deemphasis of facts" (p. 13).

"disagreed with the individual [Weber] who often is considered the founder of our field" (p. 13).

"present something of a moving target for critics" (p. 13).[Citing Bloland (1995) who does not appear in the references)).

"it is best understood not simply as a relativist perspective, but also as motivated by authors’ concerns to advocate their preferred values" (p. 18).

Postmodernism associated with

Humanities( p. 1)

Anti-Science (p. 2)

Political left (p. 4)

Radical right (p. 4)

Advocate preferences/values/women/people of color (p. 7, 9, again 9, 11)

Attack truth (p. 9)

Relativist (p. 1, 7, 9, 18)

Extreme relativism (p. 7).

Subjectivist( p. 9, 18)

Impressionistic (p. 20)

"Noting that ‘relativist’ critiques of normal science have appeared repeatedly during this century, the present article suggests that postmodernists adopt it because of the functions it serves for what appear to be their most basic focus" p. 1)

"a reaction against postmodernism and various other forms of ‘anti-science’" (p. 2).

"appears to be the call by postmodernists for us to reject the ‘Enlightenment project’ of modernism’ (p. 3)

"many postmodernists argue that anyone who claims that possession of them [objectivity or singular truth] is possible (e.g., a scientist) is engaging in a rhetorical strategy to advance their preferred values and interests" (p. 3).

"and they accuse scientists of representing as truth ideas that serve the interests of socially and politically repressive forces" (p. 3).

"most typically express sympathies associated with the political left" (p. 4)

"Its direct forebears appear to have had a very opposite orientation [Right]], many postmodernists take a stance that is radical, but less readily pigeon-holed" (p. 4).

QUALITATIVE - "Methodologically, their opposition to the institutionalization of the scientific ethos manifested itself as a predilection for qualitative over quantitative research" (p.12).

"commonly focus on advocating preferences, which often are seen as being at odds with conventional values" (p. 7).

"they often do so by adopting a relativist position" (p. 7)

"providing a basis for discrediting conventional views" (p. 7)

"defending against opposition to one’s own view" (p. 7).

"appear to favor a more extreme relativism [than moderate relativism of idealism], questioning whether anything is more than mere individual perception or interpretation, such that nothing can be said to be objectively true" (p. 7).

"solipsim – that the ‘self’ is the only thing that can be known and verified, is regarded by philosophers as especially untenable" (p. 8).

"That advocacy and relativist argumentation often are found together in postmodernist writing suggests that relativism facilitates advocacy" (p. 9).

"a subjectivist perspective may provide a basis for skepticism regarding views one wishes to discredit" (p. 9) {note skepticism is now ironic}

"seems to attack the concept of truth in order to undermine the credibility of others’ views" (p. 9)

"function of relativism for postmodernists, to deflect criticism of one’s own position, also involves diminishing or eliminating the role of truth" (p. 9)

"associating it with adbocacy for groups considered victimized, such as women and people of color" (p. 11).

"there seem to be so many ‘brands’ of postmodernism that criticism usually can be explained away as having disregarded the real postmodernists or not having included all of the postmodernists" (p. 13). [This becomes ironic later in the essay, as all postmodernism and postmodernists are lumped into one totality]

"Consistent with the relativist viewpoint – that each of us has a different viewpoint – postmodernists generally acknowledge that any one reading of a text is necessarily a subjective one, and that alternative readings therefore are always possible" (p. 18).

"So many commentators have argued that it is a revolutionary approach" (p. 21).

"challenges the status quo" (from A & D, cited p. 21).K&M "struggle against powerful entrenched interests; B&D "rebel’s guide … our revolutionary battle cry" (p. 21). {Becomes the characterization of all postmodernists].

Postmodernism’s

Subjectivism (p. 8)

"almost exclusively sympathetic view to which organization theorists have been exposed" (p. 1)

"balance to the overwhelmingly favorable view of postmodernism that has been presenting in our field’s literature" (p. 4, p. 13).[This becomes ironic, as the unfavorable assessments by postmodernists are used as evidence].

"typically … founded on the repudiation of an idea that they characterize as modernist" (p. 1)

"its more typical uses as a characterization of the area" (p. 2). "its more typical uses … a style of architecture" (p. 2).

One of the perspectives "referring to the mind-body problem, this debate contrasts ‘materialism’ (or ‘realism’) with ‘idealism’" (p. 7). "pure idealist view is that forests (and for that matter forest products, such as the pages of this journal) exist only as subjective perceptions or interpretations, that is, as ideas in your mind " (p. 7).

"are fairly direct descendants of those [Humanities-types] who have focused on issues of values and preferences and who have desired to advocate theirs]" (p. 11).

Postmodernism

"(the philosophical doctrine of idealism is not related to the common use of the term to refer to the pursuit of noble principles)" (p. 7) [Sets up double meaning].

Modernist

Modernism

Modernity

"there is an objective truth" (p. 1);

"that can be sought out rationally" (p. 1) "and systematically" (p. 1).

"systematic search for objective truth – i.e., science" (p. 3).

Normal Science

Science

Scientist

"those engaged in ‘normal science’ are concerned with the question of what is true" (p. 1).

"science’s examination of humans can be seen as an incrusion onto the intellectual turf staked out by the Humanities" (p. 11).

"Humanities-oriented historians clashed [in Germany] with scientifically-oriented economists and sociologists" (p. 11).

Humanities – "their work was marked by partisan political advocacy" (p. 12).

Weber - "Science, the realy of truth-finding, could never be capable of resolving differences of values, preferences, and interests, and must be kept separate from politics" (p. 12). " (p. 12).

Clegg (1990)

Binzagr & Manning, 1996; Parker, 1995; Radhakrashnan, 1994

Relativist (p. 3)

Subjectivist (p. 3)

Boje & Dennehy (1993)

Burrell (1994)

Kilduff & Mehra (1997)

Controversy (p. 3)

"acknowledging some of the criticisms with which postmodernism has been met in other fields" (p. 3)

"offered a somewhat kinder and gentler version in an effort to rescue postmodernism from this "chorus of negativity" (p. 4).

"avoiding a characteristic writing style that some regard as unnecessarily obscure" (p. 4).

"to avoid the trap of solipsism they advocated an ‘affirmative’ postmodernist stance, which acknowledges reality" (p. 8) {context is discussion of wide range of positions}.

"core once relativism is stripped away is ‘the rigorous pursuit of radical interpretations’" (p. 8).

"their cogent and supportive commentary on postmodernist organizational analysis" (p. 13).

"noting that discussions of postmodernism have tended to be overly abstract" (p. 13).

"five examples of ‘work that responds creatively to postmodern problematics’" (p. 13) [no page number provided, making a trace tedious].

"They stated it a bit differently: ‘postmodernists prefer the interesting over the obvious and place a high value on paradox, contrast, counterintuition, and humor’ ([p. 473)" (p. 15). {The irony is the prefix "by contrast" is cut from the sentence. The signifier "it" refers to what is good versus what is true dichotomy in the essay (see summary of 5 studies below) but the reverse is the "by contrast" asserted in Kilduff & Mehra (p. 473). Donaldson’s preference for "good" over "interesting" (Donaldson, 1995: 232). Thus a reversal of meaning.}

Kilduff & Mehra (1997)

"they acknowledged (in contrast to other postmodernists) that it is not impossible to determine what is true, and they accepted as potentially useful scientific methods such as experimentation and statistical analysis" (p. 4).

"call for ‘revolutionary undermining of assumptions,’ ‘radical reinterpretations,’ and a storming of ‘the Bastille of conventional thinking’ link them to the postmodernist mainstream" (p. 4).

"not unusual for postmodernists to describe themselves as rebels and radicals" (p. 4).

"often is substantially less clear precisely against what they are rebelling" (p. 4).

Kilduff & Mehra (1997)

"acknowledged postmodernism’s solipsistic tendencies and, following Rosenau (1992), argued that extreme idealism is not characteristic of postmodernism in general, but of skeptical postmodernism"(p. 8) {The ironic move is intertextual: K&M call for going beyond skeptical-affirmative dichotomy (1997: 455)}.

Kilduff & Mehra (1997)

(Irony) in the 5 studies by non-postmodernists.

1. Burt –postmodernist - "avoiding the dullness of objective analysis" (p. 15).; Burt "surprise at K&M characterization" (p. 20).

2. Kondo –postmodernist- "it illustrated the broad relevance of fiction: (p. 15) "qualitative, impressionistic" (p. 20).

3. Cassell – postmodernist "expressed strong feminist opinions and made no claims to be telling the truth" (p. 15). "qualitative, impressionistic" (p. 20).

4. Merton – postmodernist "for reading as fiction rather than as science" (p. 15).

Burt - "resulting in ‘a revolutionary undermining of assumptions that go far beyond the particular data set in question" (p. 24)( {the irony here is omitting the prefix "Thus, the data reanalysis is powerfully tied to a" and replacing it with "resulting in" setting up a double meaning.}

Rereading Burt. "The study by Burt … can be read as an exemplar of normal science, rather than as postmodernist" (p. 19).

"… making the data available to others strongly suggest his commitment to the progressive cumulation of theory-based data and to the determination of truth, no matter how that might reflect on his own preferences" (p.20). "Burt (personal communication, July, 1997) indicated surprise at Kilduff and Mehra’s characterization" (p. 20). Irony: The context of K&M’s point about Burt’s work being a "passionate statement of advocacy is the opposite to the author’s conclusion: "There is no pretense in the article that the analysis has been performed simply in the service of science. As a passionate statement of advocacy for a particular perspective, Burt’s work succeeds in communicating the excitement of personal discovery rather than the dullness of objective analysis" (K&M, p. 469).

In addition, since the author does not provide either the evidence given to Burt or any direct quotes from Burt’s (personal communication) we do not know what Burt is interpreting.

2. Kondo – "They argued that her work demonstrated that "fiction, therefore, applies not just to the world outside the self, but also to the constitution of the self’" (p. 14). {First, Irony is omitting what "therefore" refers to, in Kilduff & Mehra, it refers to the prior sentence "Her work is postmodern in a very explicit way: she showed how texts and selves are crafted productions within very specific social contexts" (p. 470). Saying her work demonstrated fiction, is a substitution of an opposite meaning; Second Kondo they argue, avoided reduction of male/female difference, which, ironically gets transposed in the essay.}

3. Cassell – "They characterized it as postmodern ‘in possessing personal certainty and convictions, but eschewing dogmatic claims to verity’" (p. 14). {The irony here is the contextual-opposite meaning given in the prior sentence: "Cassell, as author, was quite frank about the possibility that she might be ‘projecting upon the surgeons ….my feeling of utter visceral certainty says more about me than about the women surgeons" (p. 71)} Second, {the sentence after, "Cassell’s work also underplays the rhetorical importance of methodological rigor, seeks an explanation of difference beyond simple gender or biological dichotomies, gives voice to underrepresented narratives, and attempts an ambitions resolution to the problem of generalizing from her sample" (p. 471) {The irony is that dogmatic becomes the tag word to Cassell, when she avoids dichotomies, and has a focus on MOS issues of rigor and generalizability}. {By chopping context from Kilduff & Mehra, ironic reversals in meaning and reductionists dichotomies are re-constructed in the essay.}

4. Merton – "Kilduff and Mehra praised this article as ‘an aesthetically pleasing text that masquerades not as science but as finely wrought fiction’" (p. 15). {the irony here is the context out of which the quote is extracted. The prefix to the sentence-segment, reads "Merton overwhelmed the reader with the sheer volume of evidence but managed to array this evidence in …" The prefix and quoted segment is embedded in a paragraph, within a two-page explanation of how Merton "is "overcoming the problems of how to represent the evidence and how to assert the the truth of a claim.}

Rereading. "Although it paralleled the form of the epistolary novel in the very literal sense of reproducing letters" (p. 19) {the ironic move is reductionism. Ignoring the long list of rhetoric moves pointed out by Kilduff * Mehra.}

"Merton specifically criticized contemporary relativist perspectives, as when he expressed the hope (Merton, 1995, p. 390) that ‘even in this postmodern age of deconstruction, evidentiary truth can still prevail;" (p. 19). {Irony: reasserts role of science is truth through evidence, where postmodernist do not note contradictions to their own analysis}.

5. Schachter & Festinger – "an explicit appeal to classic references in the field" and because it is a "masterpiece of double-coded, hilarious drama" (p. 15). {Ironic because of the paragraph left out between the two quotes, juxtaposed together. The paragraph explains their reference to William Jame’s connection between bodily states and emotions, "work from very different ereas is treated as a part of a continuum. There is no pretence of a drastic ‘break’ with tradition.’ It is not just that it is a classics continuum to contemporary, but the gesture of making "translated copies of this work [available] to the reader, thus, in a characteristic postmodernist gesture, including the reader in the research endeavor" (p. 474). Second irony, "the prior sentence and prefix to the second sentence-segment are omitted, which reverses the meaning. The prior sentence and prefix read: "All of these vital references establish an historical context for the contemporary research. The experiment itself is …" Result: The dichotomy science-fiction is introduced, when Kilduff and Mehra, say the "experiment is an example of how a postmodernist social science can employ stagecraft, tradition, humor, and the full panoply of modernist methodology to examine topics … that lie at the boundaries of several disciplines and thus escape the segregated academic departments" (p. 475).

Kilduff & Mehra (1997)

3 reference to POS work.

2. Martin (1990) – "wished to demonstrate that corporations, despite their rhetoric, were not exhibiting sensitivity to the concerns of women in the workplace" (p. 18).

3. Boje (1995) – "likes storytelling, novels, Star Wars, and bosses who treat their subordinates respectfully" (p. 18).

"may seem, therefore, an odd illustration of postmodern research, the author’s choice of publication outlets helps to demonstrate how a perspective that views the world as largely illusory translates intro research practice." (p. 16). {The irony is italicizing research and restricting empirical to what is published outside the AMR}

"Jacques Derrida, the French postmodernist whose method ‘deconstruction,’ is Kilduff’s inspiration" (p. 16). Note: the equivalence of "there is nothing beyond or outside the text" (p. 16) with "the broad purview to deconstruction" and to idealism, is not an informed reading of Derrida’s use of the phrase. Best & Kellner (1997: 231) point out this move in Gross & Levitt is "blatant interpretive error" since "Derrida himself rejected the idealist interpretation of his epigram "There is nothing outside of the text" (1981a: 51ff). {The irony is the distortion and caricature of Derrida and Kilduff.

"Kilduff’s article didn’t provide data about organizations, but was instead a critique of Organizations," march and Simon’s 1958 book" (p. 16) {The ironic move is to dualize data as only empirical, consistent with the move above that AMR does not publish :empirical research."}.

2. Martin (1990) – "she forthrightly expressed reservations about this method" (p. 16) this=deconstruction.

"Acknowledging arguments regarding deconstruction;s potential political conservatism, and acknowledging that deconstructionist writing has mystified rather than clarified its principles" (p. 16).

"The text … three sentences from a transcript…" (p. 17). "Martin argued that his use of the phrase "we have a young woman" rather than "a young woman works for us," was a highly significant sexual ‘double entendre’ that (among other things) "supports men’s dominance of production in the public arena" (p. 350) (p. 17). "She concluded that her deconstruction "revealed that the primary beneficiary of this apparently well-intentioned effort to ‘help’ was the corporation –not the woman or her child’ (p. 356)" (p. 16). {Irony: the Organization Science outlet, journal welcoming empirical analysis, in fact this journal, is not mentioned, and moves Martin makes to trivialize her data and analysis to dismiss the work as not scientific.}

"Martin’s application of deconstruction might at first appear to have followed Derrida’s description of that method" (19). This is followed by a quote from K& M (p. 456) on deconstruction and one by Derrida (1988: 144) "’know the corpus of Rousseau as well as possible, including all the contexts that determine it … otherwise one could indeed say just anything at all." (a citation also found in Kilduff & Mehra, p. 456). {ironic move is to state Martin misapplies deconstruction. That she is therefore not doing deconstruction. But, the essay imitates deconstruction: "this article will follow that tradition and reread some of these texts" (p. 18).}

Another reference to "three sentence passage" (p. 19). "there is no evidence … Martin was admirably candid in admitting that she was going beyond the data, but did this widely-cited deconstruction yield insights that justify this admittedly tenuous link to actuality?" (p. 19). {repeats above moves, but recasts Martin as doing tenuous links to actuality.}

3. Boje (1995) –"The author described a play, ‘Tamara,’ in which audiences follow actors through various sets" (p. 17).

"Using previously published accounts and some archival data he retold the very familiar story that Disney was not universally regarded as a nice person" (p. 17)

"The author contended that, as in Tamara, there is more than just one way to look at something" (p. 17) {The italicized "Tamara" is an ironic usage. The essay is itself a Tama with a "Meet the Postmodernist" fantasy masquerading as a model to set up a series of encounters on his stage.}"Although not explaining why it is good that Eisner gave identity to Michael Jackson, the author’s admiration for Lucas was evident from his disappointment that "In the Star Tours ride at Disneyland, the signs and symbols of Star Wars, the film, hve been uncoupled from the historical referents and spirituality of that story’ (p. 1017). [Mis-reading and Mis-representation: the author (1995) did not say this, Eisner is telling a story about a customer’s observation, to make his own point. {The ironic moves are to not report that the article appeared in Academy of Management Journal and to portray the article as the statement of the "good" thereby ascribing the good:true duality.}

"with what new insights can his postmodernist approach be credited? His appropriation of humanist subject matter as a methodological innovation for organizational research, offering a theatrical experience as a model for how to think about things, made the familiar point that there are, indeed, many ways to think about things" (p. 18).

Morgan (1989)

Lawson (1989)

Connell & Nord (1996)

Connell & Nord (1996)

Lehman (1991); Thomspon (1993)

Jacques (1992)

"defended the side with which he sympathized by attacking their opponents, who claimed to have clear and compelling evidence of the truth of their own position, as merely falling back on ‘referential expertise and notions of accuracy’" (p. 10).

Martin & Frost (1996)

"Frost … explained that it was as a result of joining this postmodernist vanguard that he felt "it was not potentially ok to do qualitative research …" (p. 20-21). {Frost (1995) from which the quote is drawn does not refer to himself as postmodernist or in the postmodernist vanguard (though he may be) (p. 601).

"made similar comments on its meager payoff so far (1996, p. 212), noting that ‘there is a lot of talk of resistance …’ Although Martin (whose work is reviewed above) was the only published author they cited, they too, were optimistic, stating that "recently, more empirical work has been done’ " (p.22). {In actuality, A&D list quite a number of empirical studies, including a second published study by Martin (1995) which is not cited by the author. The context of the quote from A&D (1996: 212) is the statement "Part of the criticism arises from a narrow view of the notion of ‘empirical’ but researchers can still be faulted for doing many conceptual essays without extended field experience and reports" (p. 212). The context of the essay is interdisciplinary work between critical theory and postmodern theory. Empirical work is noted in a dozen studies: (Rosen, 1985; 1988; Knights & Wilmott 1987; 1992; Alvesson 1996) on p. 212 and elsewhere work by Calas & Smircish (1988, 1991), Clegg (1990); Deetz (1994c); Foucault (1977), Mumby (1987), Rosen (1985), - My sincere apologies if I have left anyone out.

Boje, Gephart & Thatchenkery (1996)

"arguing that postmodernism had great potential, but was continually subjected to harsh repression" (p. 22). {the enitre empirical work in the from 1958 to 1993, a year by year reading, is rejected because it does not support Daft;s (1980) study of qualitative content in five volumes.}

"Its inaugural volume in 1957" (p. 22). {The inaugural year of ASQ is 1956, not 1957).

1. Nietzsche

2. Burrell

3. Foucault

5. Foucault

6. Derrida

7. Heidegger

8. Nietzsche

"neither been well received in our field nor has yet yield much research … this article questions whether those failures are, as they suggest, explain by the early stage of this subfield’s development and to repression by its opponents" (p. 23).

"has more to do with its basic nature than with its relative novelty or with academic conspiracies" (p. 23).

{Ironic move is to accuse them of claiming conspiracy while developing one}.

1. Nietzsche –"idealist philosophies have developed from a variety of sources, but the most significant source of postmodernism, in particular, is the German philosopher Nietzsche" (p. 23).

"a nearly (solipsistic) perspective in Nietzsche’s early writing that he consistently disavowed in his mature works – that there are "no facts," but "only interpretations" (Nietzsche 1968a)’" (p. 23).

CONTEXT STRIPPING & IRONY. {Weiss (p. 23) cites Clark (1990: 2) to allege Nietzsche is nearly solipsistic "no facts", but "only interpretations: "no truths" …

"once associated with the political right, a rallying point [now] for the epistemological left" (p. 23).

The context is both Clark (199) and Aschheim 1992) are polemic discourses, picking up on themes of earlier polemic discourses (as reviewed in Kaufman, 1968). POIINT Clark (1990: 81) Berkeley is the author of sosolipsistic-idealism.

"Like Berkely, Schopenhauer claims to be defending common sense by insisting that the empirical world exists only as representation and not independently of consciousness. Nietzsche, in contrast, apparently thinks that common sense affirms the independent existence of the external world. Nietzsche agrees with Schopenhauer that the world we perceive exists only as representation. But because he thinks "we believe we know something about the things themselves [the extramentally existing things] when we speak of tress, colors, snow, and flowers," he presumable does not reject the whole idea of independently existing objects as contradictory. He simply denies our perceptual access to such objects" (Clark 1999: 81, additions hers). Clark’s project is to differentiate between Nietzsche’s "rejection of "metaphysical correspondence theory" and the correspondence theory critiques, of William James, Richard Rorty, and Hilary Putnam (p. 40). "All three seem to accept the two points that I have claimed commit Nietzsche to understanding truth as correspondence, namely, the equivalence proinciple (that "grass is green" is true… ) and common sense realism (the claim that the world exists independently of our representations of it)" (p. 4). Weiss appears to advocate the "common sense realism" [ontological realism, p. 41she critiques, while confusing Nietzsche with Berkeley, to reverse what Clark claims Nietzsche’s position to be. Rorty clearly rejects the correspondence or mirror theory of trugh, as a subjective idealism. Nietzsche questions metaphysical realism, favoring a corrposendence that Rorty rejects. "Realism, in contrast, holds that the world’s nature, essence, or character – and therefore the truth about it – is independent of knowers. Realism may seem to follow from common sense realism. Whether it does follow depends on how we understand ‘independent’ and knowers’ in the above formulation" (p. 45, referring here to Putman’s formulation).

"for those who attack with revolutionary fervor traditional beliefs and attitudes concerning truth [and] science’’ (p. 23 citing Clark, 1990: 2).

"foremost among his right-wing admirers were Hitler and Mussolini (Aschheim, 1992)" (p. 23). TRACING STEPS {author cites Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil without giving a page number}. {See main text for actual quote and Kaufman responses to the master race and raical union links to Nazi).

"that some postmodernists blame modernism for the Holocaust probably may best be seen as part of the debate over whether this historical link to nazism should make us wary of postmodernism’s current applications" (p. 23). (Synecdoche).

Foucault (p. 24) "perhaps the most important founder of postmodernism, who came across Nietzsche’s writing shortly after his disenchantment with Marxism (Munch, 1994). {No page number given}.

(Munch, 1994), has described postmodernism, dismissivley, as ‘propagated by disappointed former Marxist’". {reply: Others, such as Alvesson & Deetz (1996) note founder of POS is Derrida – RESPONSE: A & D think that former Marxists make the best postmodernists. See also Parker review of BGT, 96)}

"As A&D (1996) have noted, the other preeminent founder of postmodernism (particularly in terms of influence on organization studies) is Jacques Derrida…" (p.24). The context of the reference reads in the original:

"These philosophically based approaches to organization studies have emerged out of works of Derrida and Foucault in particular, and to a lesser degree Baudrillard, Deleuze and Guattari, and Laclau and Mouffe. Much more so than with critical theory this is a wide group of writers and positions with quite different research agendas" (p. 192). {Again, the move here is to replace the set of very different influences, with just deconstruction and conspiracy. Indexing the whole instead of asseing the elements of the set}.

Foucault --- Saying that he studied prisons and hospitals in "liberal democratic societies" is uninformed. {Foucault is alleged to add to Nietzsche’s concern for post, an analysis of forms of oppression (p. 24). But, Kaufman points out that Nietzsche storied forms of oppression in his own work.}.

p. 27- "Criticisms of Foucault also have called this perspective’s [emancipatory politics of postmodernism] political and ethical implications into question. For example, Hirsch (1991) has wondered how Foucault, who spent his teenage years in a Nazi-occupied French town, during which time its Jewish residents were herded into cattle cars and sent to concentration camps, could argue that ‘power is tolerable, only on condition that it mask a substantial part of itself, its success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms’ Foucault, 1978, p. 86)"

RESPONSE: There is no evidence that Foucault has any link to Nazism in Hirsch (1991), or elsewhere. The innuendo comes from Hirsch’s (1991: 122-4) reading of Stephen Riggins (1983) interview with Foucault. Hirsch (1991) wants Foucault to link his theory of bureaucratic abuse of power and exploitation to the brutal Nazi occupation. Foucault, in Riggins, refers to "I experienced one of my first great frights when Chancellor Dollfuss was assassinated by the Nazis in, I think, 1934. … I remember very well that I was really scared by that. … I also remember refugees from Spain arriving in Poitiers. I remember fighting in school with my classmates about the Ethiopian War I think that boys and girls of this generation had their childhood formed by these great historical events. The menace of war was our background, our framework of existence" (Foucault from Riggins, in Hirsch, p. 123).

RESPONSE: How does Weiss fashion his interpretation of Hirsch’s interpretation of Foucault? Hirsch wants Foucault in the Riggins interview to recall "Foucault, who spent his teenage years in a Nazi-occupied French town, during which time its Jewish residents were herded into cattle cars and sent to concentration camps" (p. 27). However, Weiss misreads Hirsch (11991: 122-125). What Hirsch does is call Foucault’s interview response an "erasure" of historical memory, the four most traumatic of French history (Hirsch, p. 123). Hirsch calls Foucault’s response "disingenuous" (p. 124).

Weiss’s main misreading is to think that Hirsh (1991: 126-128) is describing "herding Jewish residents" of Foucault’s hometown into cattle cars. Yet, what Hirsch juxtaposes with Foucault’s interviews; is loading train wars in Germany (i.e. Semprum’s recollections), and how German boy’s threw rocks at those cars (p. 126). Hirsch asks: "If the kid of ten or eleven that Foucault remembered himself as being in, let us say 1941 or 1942, had become a German, would he also have become a '‘kraut?’" (p. 126). But, Foucault was not and did not become German.

Weiss’ reference to "liberal democracies" comes from Hirsch p. 122 reading of Foucault’s reading of Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon "It is curious that Foucault should have dedicated himself to so meticulous an analysis of the "panopticon," his paradigm (derived from Jeremy Bentham) of the way in which liberal democracies keep watch over their subjects and thus keep them repressed, while he had notghing to say about the way the Germans kept him and his neighbors in subjection from 1940 to 1944." (p. 122, additions, insertions, his).

--Hirsch says "Certainly Foucault’s erasure of his own personal experience under the Nazi occupation constitutes a screaming silence that cannot but undermine the authenticity of his analysis of liberal democracies as repressive states" (p. 122). This appears to be the thesis that Weiss has adopted, but without a careful reading of the evidence that Hirsch is introducing.

Derrida -"As with Foucault however, the influences on Derrida have provided fodder for the debate over postmodernism’s connection to nazism" (p. 24 nazism is lower-case in Weiss).

"Derrida’s greatest influence was the German philosopher Heidegger, on whose concept of destruction the idea of deconstruction was based, and whose involvement with the Nazis has been a matter of debate" (p. 24, spelled Heidigger throughout the document).

Response: Derrida’s Nazi-involvement was his defense of his friend De Man, after his writings of Le Soir and other publications were revealed. See Derrida, 1989 second edition of Memories for Paul de Man

Heidegger - "… Although scholars disagree on the extent to which Heidegger’s participation represented ideology or merely opportunism (Farias, 1989; Rorty, 1988), nazism does have many consistencies with his philosophy, which advocated strong German nationalism, and echoed Nietzsche’s contempt for democracy and Judeo-Christian ethics" (p. 24 – see Nietzsche section).

-Reference to "destruction" (p. 24), is not cited by Weiss. It comes form Lehman (1992): 23) "Martin Heidegger’s concept ofDestruktion – or, more exactly, He Heidegger’s call for the destruction (Destruktion) of ontology, the branch of metaphysics that studies the nature of being" (p. 23). RESPONSE: This is a narrow, and polemic label to use to capture Heidegger’s work on deconstruction

Heidegger - Weiss contends Heidegger’s advocacy of "strong German nationalism" and "echoed Nietzsche’s contempt for democracy and Judeo-Christian ethics" (p. 24).

RESPONSE: Heidegger was a Nazi party member.

Nietzsche - Gross patchwork here. {Nietzsche objected to morality, not ethics (and his ethics were more Aristocratic than democratic, but not pro-state), and in his book S=The Wander and His Shadow, envisioned the eventual "victory of democracy" and the "European League of Nations" (S 292) (Kaufman, 1968: 187). Nietzsche did critique contemporary democracy. He saw "democracy as something yet to come" (p. 186).

Paul de Man – "a highly influential deconstructionist" (p. 24)

Response: See Hamacher, Hertz & Keena Responses on Paul de Man’s Wartime Journalism, 1989) and Hamacher, Hertz & Keenan Wartime Journalism, 1939-1943 Paul De Man, 1988. DeMan’s

"most egregious act of complicity the the racist policies of the Occupant, his article entitled "Les Juifs dans la Litterature actuelle;" … (Klein, 1989: 285). Klein notes the dilemma of trying to study the de Man writngs. 1) reading them at all makes you complicit in apologetic; 2. Observing the fracus without reading still involves you 3) to glance at them may smack of a form of revisionism Klein reasons if we assume DeMan is the Devil, then we still have a responsibility to understand the devilish subtlety and connivance, and perversity of the writings. , what he terms the science of DeManology (p 286). POINT What Weiss dos is follow the footsteps of Christopher Norris and Geoffrey Hartman analysis of DeMan. They seek to detach DeMan’s late work from the racist and political implications of his war writing, and to to make these the dialectic object of his lat work in critique. "DeMan is seen as practicing his deconstructions against precisely the forms of totalitarian thinking which his early work exhibits most repulsively – agianst for example, the seduction of organicist metaphors that underlie nationalist claims on culture, on literature in particular, advanced under the signs of blood and soil with whose formulas DeMan’s early work is at ease" (Klein, 286). Klein objects to the dualism, since it portrays DeMan as a dupe of organicist metaphors, citing DeMan (1960) to refute the claim of dialectic. Lentricchia’s critique of DeMan as a mafia done, a chief of a family of interest whose ruthless detachment and gang-land organization evoke proto-Nazi tactics is dismissed as mythology – since DeMan’s late work is full of critique of totalizing gestures. The 3^rd possiblity explored is that DeMan was resistant to totalitarianism in his early and late works. In early work, with "technically correct rhetorical readings" Another possibility is DeMan was in the Belgain resistance (See Jon Wiener). But, others deny that claim.

Weiss (1998) himself appropriates Tamara as the imitative form and substance of his entire essay. It is a "will to truth," (Nietzsche, 1967/1888: 250) a dogmatist’s call for MOS solidarity and postmodernist-purge that I think is the tyrannical moralizing and scapegoating of a "judge and condemner," that Nietzsche protested as scientism (1967/18888: 253). "The methods of truth were not invented from motives of truth, but from motives of power, of wanting to be superior" (Nietzsche, 1967/1888: 249).

Weiss - From pp. 28 to 33, Weiss equates POS with social construction theory, and replicates his dualities, while spreading his fascist trope. "Postmodernist organization theorists not only have adopted the extreme skepticism of postmodernism’s founders abut the objective existence of the real world, they seem to have taken it to even further extremes" (p. 28). A member of the audience rudely interrupts the play: "How do you get more extreme than being relativistic, idealistic, nazi-fascism?" the curtain comes down, an unscheduled intermission is called to quiet the audience.

The contribution of social construction theory is different than that of postmodern theory. Weiss has confused a Bishop Berkeley variant of social construction (the world is in my head) to a Berger and Luckmann (1966) version which looks at the reification into what gets internalized as objective reality, but which shifts, cracks, and reforms, mutable like every bit of reality that is (Hatch, 1997 does an excellent review of this area). Stanley Fish gave this reply to the Sokal (1996) hoax:

It is not the physical world itself that is socially constructed but, rather our concepts, theories, paradigms, and methods through which we investigate and describe the world (Fish, as cited in Best & Kellner, 1997: 236)

He casually asserts: the "anything goes" characterization of postmodernism can be disproved with reference to Cilliers’ (1998) postmodernism reading of his field of complexity theory. Cilliers’ (1998: 22) does not accept the critique that Derrida (1976, 1976, 1985) or Lyotard (1984) are anything goes, "a position that" he says "can only be termed ‘relativistic’ by the ignorant." Nor does he see postmodernism or poststructuralism as "anti-scientific" or "throwing away all forms of rationality" (p. 22). He seems to understand Weiss’ presentation. "One cannot blame scientists for being skeptical about an approach that is (to my mind, incorrectly) presented in this way" (Cilliers, 1998: 22, additions, his). How does he react to the play thus far? He calls for sensitivity to complexity and contingencies, inviting Boje to use "cooler" rhetoric, logic that will not make Weiss defensive. How does Cilliers reconcile complexity science with postmodern/poststructuralism? The "argument for a multiplicity of discourses is not a willful move; it is an acknowledgement of complexity" (p. 116).

Although different discourses form ‘clusters’ within this network, they cannot isolate themselves from the network. There are always connections to other discourses. The different local narratives interact, some more than others, but no discourse is fixed or stabilized by itself. Different discourses – clusters in the network – may grow, shrink, break up, coalesce, absorb others or be absorbed… What we have is a self-organizing process in which meaning is generated through a dynamic process and not through the passive reflection of an autonomous agent that can make ‘anything go’ (Cilliers, 1998: 116).

OT Science is truth finding; postmodernism is fiction to deflect criticism of their position.

OT Science gives technical witness; postmodernists resort to the politics of feminism, race, and class.

OT Scientists are objective; postmodernists have preferences for preferred values, claim nothing can be objectively true, and differences in lies and truth can not be determined.

OT Science is about precision; postmodernists advocate values like emancipation (See objective/subjective).

OT Science is rational analysis; postmodernism hides in undecidability

Fact/Value

OT Science studies facts; postmodernists study values and preferences.

Resituation – ""… science’s examination of humans can be seen as an incrusion onto the intellectual turf staked out by the Humanities. Thus, it is in the study of human social behavior that those concerned about facts and those concerned about values seem to have come into conflict most frequently" (p. 11).

Science studies conventional reality; relativism allows postmodernists to discredit conventional views and defend opposition to their view by claiming differences in worldviews.

OT is materialism or realism; idealism is the subjective perceptions which postmodernists espouse.

Scientist do scholarship; postmodernism is a social movement of intellectuals.

OT is mainstream science; postmodernists import the Humanities.

OT is neutral; postmodernists are politically left, with right-wing prescriptions.

OT is status quo; postmodernists are radicals who do not know what they rebel against

OT is modernist; others are postmodernist, kept outside for good reasons.

Skeptical postmodernism may be less solipsist; affirmative postmodernism is latest version of idealist perspective (see materialism/idealism).

OT favors quantitative study; postmodern adopts qualitative methods.